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People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD) do things they do not want
to do, and/or they think things they do not want to think. In about 10% of OCD patients,
none of the available treatment options is effective. A small group of these patients is
currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS). DBS involves the implantation
of electrodes in the brain. These electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain
area in which they are implanted. It turns out that patients may experience profound
changes as a result of DBS treatment. It is not just the symptoms that change; patients
rather seem to experience a different way of being in the world. These global effects are
insufficiently captured by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behavioral
measures of the severity of the symptoms. In this article we aim to capture the changes in
the patients’ phenomenology and make sense of the broad range of changes they report.
For that we introduce an enactive, affordance-based model that fleshes out the dynamic
interactions between person and world in four aspects. The first aspect is the patients’
experience of the world. We propose to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field
of affordances, with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (“width” of the field),
temporal horizon (“depth”), and relevance of the perceived affordances (“height”). The
second aspect is the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-experience,
notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we point to the different characteristics of the
way in which patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers to the
stance that patients take toward the changes they experience: the second-order evaluative
relation to their interactions and themselves. With our model we intend to specify the
notion of being in the world in order to do justice to the phenomenological effects of DBS
treatment.
Keywords: Phenomenology, psychiatry, deep brain stimulation, obsessive-compulsive disorder, affordances,
enactivism, qualitative research, neurophenomenology
INTRODUCTION
People suffering from Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD)
do things they do not want to do, such as endlessly washing
their hands, checking the oven, counting their steps, or tidy-
ing up their room. And/or they think things they do not want
to think: they are plagued by aggressive, sexual, or blasphemous
visions. Some people picture themselves hurting their own chil-
dren, others think they spread deadly germs. In about 10% of
these patients, none of the available treatment options [pharma-
cotherapy or cognitive behavioral therapy (CBT)] is effective. The
disease becomes chronic and often the patient’s situation deteri-
orates. Patients may hardly leave their house anymore, or even
their room, or even their bed. A small group of these patients
is currently being treated with deep brain stimulation (DBS).
DBS involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain. These
electrodes give a continuous electrical pulse to the brain area in
which they are implanted (in the case of this study, the nucleus
accumbens), as a kind of pacemaker in the brain.
It turns out that patients may experience profound changes,
either immediately, i.e., the seconds after the DBS is turned on,
or at a later stage, when the optimal settings of the electrodes
have been found. Immediate effects for instance are that patients
become emotional, or they report seeing colors more brightly,
or feeling “as if the shutters have been opened,” or experiencing
themselves as equals of the doctors that they had been look-
ing up to just a minute ago. Long term effects include changes
in self-esteem, in social interest and communicative interac-
tions, an increase of spontaneous actions, increased expressive-
ness and creativity, and even the experience of being oneself
again.
These global and profound changes are insufficiently captured
by traditional psychiatric scales, which mainly consist of behav-
ioral measures of the severity of the symptoms. In fact, some
patients show only little improvement on the standardOCD scale,
whereas they experience a difference of day and night: to them,
life has become liveable again. It is thus not just the symptoms
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that change. These patients rather seem to experience a different
“way of being in the world” (Heidegger, 1927/1978).
Traditional scales fall short to capture these changes. But the
patients’ experiences are highly relevant: after all, they form both
the starting point for understanding and categorizing their prob-
lems, and for determining treatment options, as well as the ulti-
mate criteria for evaluating the success of treatment. Psychiatry
cannot get round accounting for patients’ experiences 1. In this
case, to understand the impact of DBS treatment we need to find
a way to make sense of the wide range of changes that patients
report.
The methods and concepts as developed in phenomenology
may be of particular use to account for the patients’ experi-
ences. The phenomenological method requires us to start from
the patients’ actual experience, rather than starting from theory
or from established categories (such as for instance presented by
the DSM IV). Moreover, it aims to get beyond merely describing
individual changes in order to elucidate changes in the structure of
experiences. In our research project we combine qualitative inter-
views with phenomenological analysis. The interviews serve to get
an overview of the patients’ experiences. Phenomenological anal-
ysis in turn helps to distinguish common patterns, or structural
changes among the wide range of individual changes. The phe-
nomenological tradition also provides a set of concepts that are
helpful to articulate (pre-reflective) experiences.
This paper is primarily a philosophical paper. Based on our
findings so far, we have developed an enactive affordance-based2
model that is intended to make the changed way of being in
the world of the patients more tangible. The model is based
on insights from phenomenology, enactivism, and ecological
psychology. We will introduce four aspects of the interactions
between person and world that together help to make sense of
the broad range of changes. Profound changes of course also
occur through other forms of treatment, as well as with patients
suffering from different psychiatric disorders. The advantage of
developing this model with regard to DBS treatment is that, com-
pared to psychotherapeutic and chemical forms of treatment, the
effects of DBS can be very quick and direct. This provides a unique
opportunity to witness “in vivo” the phenomenological changes
from disorder to recovery.
In this paper, we will first introduce OCD: its classification
criteria as well as some of the relevant phenomenological charac-
teristics. We will then provide a short explanation of DBS, before
turning to the phenomenological effects of the DBS treatment. In
the subsequent section we present our model and flesh out the
four aspects that we deem central to shed light upon the patients’
changed way of being in the world.We end with a short discussion
1Accounting for the importance of patients’ experiences does not deny the
importance of the biological and socio-cultural dimension of psychiatric dis-
orders. We rather acknowledge the complexity of psychiatric disorders than
try to reduce them to only one or two dimensions. Our model fits with a
broader enactive framework for psychiatry, one that also encompasses the
(neuro-)biological and socio-cultural dimensions of psychiatric disorders, see:
(De Haan, Submitted manuscript).
2Affordances are the possibilities for action provided to us by the environment
(Gibson, 1979). We will explain this notion and our use of it in An Enactive
Affordance-Based Model of this article.
of what the effectiveness of DBS implies for our understanding of
the relation between neural activity and experiences.
WHAT IS OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER?
John: ‘My whole day is spent checking that nothing will go wrong.
It takesme an hour to get out of the house in themorning, because
I am never sure that I’ve turned off all the electrical appliances like
the cooker, and locked all the windows. Then I check to see that
the gas fire is off five times, but if it doesn’t feel right I have to do
the whole thing again. In the end, I ask my partner to check it all
for me again anyway. At work I am always behind as I go through
everything several times in case I have made a mistake. If I don’t
check I feel so worried I can’t bear it. It’s ridiculous I know, but
I think if something awful did happen, I’d be to blame.’ (Royal
College of Psychatrists, 2009).
OBSESSIONS AND COMPULSIONS
The fourth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (DSM IV) defines obsessions as recurrent and
persistent thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced as
intrusive and inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety or
distress (American Psychiatric Association, 2000). Moreover, the
person attempts to ignore or suppress such thoughts, impulses,
or images, or to neutralize them with some other thought or
action. Also, the person recognizes that the obsessional thoughts,
impulses, or images are a product of his or her own mind (thus
not imposed from without as in schizophrenic thought insertion)
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
According to the traditional model of OCD, people are first
beset by such unwanted thoughts, which causes anxiety, and
which in turn leads to compulsions as attempts to tame this anx-
iety 3. In order to keep control and to avert the lurking danger,
people start to develop rituals, such as washing their hands, to
wash off the unwanted thoughts, or repeating little prayers as
“anti-dotes” to the venomous images. These rituals degenerate
into compulsions. DSM IV defines compulsions as “repetitive
behaviors (e.g., hand washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts
(e.g., praying, counting, repeating words silently) that the person
feels driven to perform.” These acts and behaviors are aimed at
preventing or reducing distress or at preventing some dreaded
event or situation, but they are either “not connected in a realis-
tic way with what they are designed to prevent, or they are clearly
excessive” (American Psychiatric Association, 2000).
PHENOMENOLOGY OF OCD
From a phenomenological perspective, several characteristics are
central. First of all, patients suffering fromOCD do things they do
notwant to do, and they think things they do notwant to think. In
a basic way they do experience agency: there is no doubt for them
that their thoughts are their own, or that they themselves are the
ones washing their hands, for instance. This distinguishes them
from schizophrenic patients whose basic sense of agency may be
disturbed: schizophrenic patients may not experience themselves
as the source of their thinking or acting. In another way, however,
3Although this may be a common course of the illness, it does not capture all
cases (Denys, 2011).
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the agency of OCD patients is impaired: their compulsions are
not something they want to do. OCD patients just feel overrid-
ingly driven to act that way. In this sense, their actions go against
ordinary, self-governed agency. This is where the patients’ feeling
of impaired freedom comes from. Many OCD patients compare
their experiences to being imprisoned by their thoughts and/or
the constant tension and pressure to perform certain actions.
Secondly, they know their compulsive behaviors do not make
sense. They know that their behavior is irrational—albeit in
different degrees of conviction. Some patients say things like:
“I know a bit of dirt won’t kill me, but better be safe than sorry,”
or: “I know it is ridiculous to wash my hands that often. Still
washing your hands is important; you never know what germs
you may contaminate your house with.” Others clearly distance
themselves from their compulsions, regarding them as downright
pointless and nonsensical. In contrast to patients suffering from
delusions, OCD patients have insight in the fact of the matter, but
these facts do not change their feelings of fear and disgust. Their
affective states thus seem to take precedence over their rational
thoughts.
When patients explain why they do things that they do not
want to do and that they moreover consider to be nonsense,
they refer to the experience of tension and anxiety that becomes
unbearable unless they do succumb to performing their compul-
sive rituals. This tension is so strong that some patients compare
this experience to being pushed under water: you HAVE to
get to the surface to get air NOW. They describe an extremely
anxious feeling when they cannot perform their compulsions
immediately—and often they will later make up for the missed
rituals. Moreover, patients report that they have to keep on per-
forming their compulsion “until it feels right.” This feeling is often
described in terms of a lessening of tension, or as a feeling of
“completion.” That is, only after several repetitions (or hours of
repetitions) does the feeling set in that the action is really com-
pleted (Pitman, 1987; Rasmussen and Eisen, 1992; Summerfeldt,
2004). One of our patients (P6) described it as the feeling that
“the penny has dropped.”
Another remarkable characteristic is the patients’ extensive
need and striving for explicit control. In part, we can understand
this need for control as the corollary of the experience of tension.
The experience of a certain tension, and of uncertainty whether or
not you have done something and whether or not you have done
it correctly, is familiar to all of us. Just as familiar is the response
to maximize conscious control over your actions.
Speaking very generally, we can say that we experience a certain
tension when things are not optimal. According to Merleau-Ponty
(1945/2002), our normal actions have the structure of striving
toward an optimal grip. Deviations from such optimal grip lead to
tension, and to what Rietveld calls “the urge to move to improve”
(Rietveld, 2012a). Merleau-Ponty gives the example of moving to
the optimal distance to watch a painting, Dreyfus (Dreyfus, 2002)
mentions the optimal distance toward other people in an eleva-
tor. Attaining and maintaining an optimal grip usually happens
quite unreflectively. This specific distance just “feels right”: it is
not so much that we pay conscious attention to, or deliberate on
our acts, but rather, in a way that resembles skillful improvisation.
The tendency toward an optimal grip is a basic concern of living
organisms. It shapes the person’s selective openness to affordances
so that certain affordances stand out as relevant and the indi-
vidual can unreflectively improve his or her situation by simply
being responsive to this structured field of relevant affordances
(Rietveld, 2012a,b).
On the other hand, we sometimes do need to deliberate or
explicitly pay attention to what we do when our unreflective han-
dling does not suffice. For instance, when you are unsure whether
you did something correctly, such as locking the door, you check
it. Or when you want to avoid making a mistake, you pay extra,
conscious attention to what you are doing. In general, when
things go wrong, or when you are learning a new skill, you will
rely on deliberation and conscious attention to your acts. The
conscious attention to actions is thus not in itself pathological,
or even irrational. It is a natural reaction to the experience of ten-
sion. It only becomes pathological when the awareness is out of
proportion 4. It seems that obtaining an optimal grip normally
implies a balance between unreflective action on the one hand
and deliberation and reflexive awareness of one’s actions on the
other hand.
This balance seems to be disturbed in OCD patients. We sug-
gest that one of the processes that maintains and aggravates
this imbalance is what we call the “hyper-reflexivity trap” (De
Haan et al., 2013). Hyper-reflexivity (Frankl, 1946/2009; Laing,
1960/1990; Sass and Parnas, 2003; Fuchs, 2011b) refers to the
exaggerated tendency to reflect on or pay conscious awareness to
what one is doing—not afterwards (like ruminations) but rather
during the performance itself. Every act becomes a conscious,
deliberate decision instead of just a spontaneous response to a
situation. For example, when you are ill at ease at a reception
where you hardly know anybody, you may become unpleas-
antly aware of yourself, in this room full of people, and you
may start to wonder what to do, whether to get another drink,
which group to join, how to hold your hands, how to pose
yourself. Such awkward self-awareness is the opposite of the flu-
ent, spontaneous way in which we usually deal with the world.
In our terminology: the disturbed unreflective way of attain-
ing optimal grip comes with an excessive amount of reflective
deliberation.
As Fuchs (Fuchs, 2011b) points out, an experience of alien-
ation of the familiar leads to hyper-reflexivity, but hyper-
reflexivity in turn aggravates the alienation. In the case of OCD
patients, we can indeed see such a negative spiral at work. The
“hyper-reflexivity trap” proceeds through several stages (DeHaan
et al., 2013):
(1) First, there is the feeling of tension: the feeling of having
insufficient grip.
4OCD patients experience tension, they explicitly acknowledge that they want
to have grip on things, and they strive for things to “feel right.” However, they
apparently experience this tensionmuch sooner (e.g., with regard to situations
that to other people appear harmless) and also more intensely than others
generally do. What could be the cause of this deviation? To date, there is no
conclusive answer to the question where this tension comes from. And there
need not be just one answer: there could be various causal trajectories at play
in different patients [cf. (Borsboom et al., 2011)].
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(2) This feeling leads to attempts to regain control through delib-
eration (Whatmight have gone wrong?Whatmight go wrong
in the future? How can I prevent that?), and reflexive aware-
ness of one’s actions (trying to perform all actions with
maximal attention).
(3) But too much reflexive awareness can be dangerous: analyz-
ing and paying attention to your movements may lead to
alienation and typically augments insecurity5.
(4) As a last step, the increase of insecurity brings us back to the
first step.
Too much deliberation and reflexive awareness thus disturbs the
balance that is required for experiencing grip, and it may even
lead to a negative self-reinforcing spiral of feelings of tension
and insecurity and subsequent attempts to gain explicit con-
trol. Normally we unreflectively know how much deliberation is
optimal in particular circumstances and are unreflectively respon-
sive to the experienced tensions to improve our grip on the
situation. In OCD a disturbance of the normal tension-guided
tendency toward an optimal grip (stage 1) probably sets the
hyper-reflexivity trap in motion.
SUFFERING AND TREATMENT
OCD is a highly disabling disorder. The World Health
Organization lists it as one of the twenty most disabling diseases
(Heyman et al., 2006). Patients spend much time and energy on
their compulsions, which leads to an increasingly small world.
They simply lack the time to participate normally in daily life.
Moreover, the patients’ awareness of the meaninglessness of their
behavior adds considerably to their suffering. “If I lift and replace
that chair 3000 times each day, then that is a day, well, one
might just as well have been dead,” one of our patient (P4)
says. Another patient (P1) says: “My life feels so terribly empty
(. . .). Often, when I go to bed at night, I think, “what did I
do today?” Well, I have washed my hands, I have cleaned my
eyes, I have put on clothes, I have brushed my teeth, I have
washed my hair, I have eaten something—and well, that is it.”
OCD patients know that their obsessions and compulsions do
not make sense and they are often ashamed of what they cannot
help but doing. Because of these feelings of shame, they usu-
ally try to hide their compulsions from others, and make up
all kinds of excuses to avoid situations that trigger these com-
pulsions. But the excuses, the concealing and the lying in their
turn only contribute to the aversion they feel toward them-
selves. In addition, their experience of a lack of understanding
by people in their environment often leads to feelings of intense
loneliness.
Many patients only start to seek help after many years of
increasing difficulties to participate in ordinary life (Heyman
et al., 2006). This is perhaps due to the fact that the illness is
still relatively unknown, and maybe also because of the shame
5Research on memory shows that patients with OCD do not have memory
impairments per se, but rather distrust their memory: it is thus the attitude
towards their memory that is affected. Interestingly, the same happens to nor-
mal controls who are instructed to repeatedly check their tasks. The checking
thus augments the feeling of insecurity. See: (van den Hout and Kindt, 2003).
that patients experience. Once they do seek help, about 50–60%
of patients respond well to treatment with Cognitive Behavioral
Therapy (CBT) and/or medication (Heyman et al., 2006; Denys
et al., 2010). About 10% of these patients, however, do not
respond to any form of treatment (Denys et al., 2010). OCD then
becomes a chronic disorder. For these patients, DBS may be a
treatment option.
WHAT IS DEEP BRAIN STIMULATION?
DBS involves the implantation of electrodes in the brain which
give a continuous electrical pulse to modulate specific brain areas.
Usually the target brain area is stimulated in both hemispheres.
Each lead contains four electrodes. The leads are connected
through a wire to a battery that is placed subcutaneously below
the clavicle or in the abdomen. The activity of the electrode can
be programmed externally with a portable appliance communi-
cating with the pulse generator through telemetry. The electrodes
can be stimulated separately, as a result of which the anatomic
reach of the stimulation area can be adjusted. Frequency, inten-
sity, and pulse width are also programmable. Typical stimulation
parameters vary for the frequencies between 2 and 185Hz, for
the current power between 0 and 10V, and for the pulse widths
between 60 and 150ms. The programming facility has the advan-
tage that, after implantation, the stimulation can be optimized
in order to increase the therapeutic effect and to decrease side
effects.
DBS is mainly used for people who suffer from advanced
Parkinson’s disease, but it is also used as a treatment against
epilepsy, movement disorders, dystonia, and chronic pain. About
80.000 people worldwide have been treated with DBS, the major-
ity of which are Parkinson’s disease patients. In the last decade,
the use of DBS for treatment resistant psychiatric disorders is
being tested (Mayberg et al., 2005; Mallet et al., 2008; Malone
et al., 2009; Denys et al., 2010). There are no exact figures
on the number of psychiatric patients who are treated with
DBS. We estimate that worldwide ∼200 patients with psychi-
atric disorders receive DBS treatment. At the Academic Medical
Center (AMC) in Amsterdam 42 OCD patients and 22 patients
with major depression are currently being treated. That makes
it one of the biggest centers for DBS treatment for psychiatric
disorders.
Since DBS is still a new and experimental form of treatment for
psychiatric disorders, there is no consensus yet on which brain
region would be the best target for the various disorders (de
Koning et al., 2011). At the AMC, both OCD patients and major
depression patients are stimulated at the nucleus accumbens. An
earlier study has shown that this treatment is effective in ∼2/3 of
the OCD patients (Denys et al., 2010).
Until now, the exact operating mechanism of DBS is not
known. There are two general hypotheses. (McIntyre et al., 2004).
One is that DBS causes a functional lesion by inhibiting the stimu-
lated brain core. This inhibition can be caused by a depolarization
blockage of the neurons, by synaptic depression (exhaustion) or
by synaptic inhibition via “neuronal jamming”; inducing a mean-
ingless activation pattern (McIntyre et al., 2004). The second
hypothesis is that DBS activates the neuronal network connected
to the brain core which is stimulated. Then stimulation leads to a
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modulation of the pathological activity in the neuronal network.
It is most likely that the therapeutic effects of DBS are caused
by a combination of direct and indirect effects dependent on
the specific cytoarchitecture of the stimulated brain area. Because
the field intensity of the electrode decreases exponentially with
distance, neurons are influenced in various ways. The neuronal
cell body is probably inhibited in the center of the stimulation
area, and the axonal terminals are stimulated on the edge of the
stimulation area.
Based on fMRI and EEG research with OCD patients who are
stimulated in the nucleus accumbens, the AMC group hypothe-
sizes that DBS causes changes in the connectivity between brain
areas and restores intrinsic brain network dynamics, rather than
merely having inhibitory or excitatory effects at the target area
(Figee et al., 2013). In particular, stimulation of the nucleus
accumbens of OCD patients “normalizes nucleus accumbens
activity and restores intrinsic frontostriatal network dynamics”
(Figee et al., 2013). Moreover, they found that frontostriatal con-
nectivity changes were strongly correlated with OCD symptom
improvement. It seems that DBS normalizes pathological brain
functioning locally at the stimulation site and globally throughout
its connected frontostriatal network (Figee et al., 2013).
EFFECTS OF DBS TREATMENT ON THE EXPERIENCES OF
OCD PATIENTS
METHODS
We are currently investigating the effects of DBS treatment on
the OCD patients’ experiences by combining with qualitative
research methods with phenomenologically informed analysis.
Qualitative research methods are aimed at answering questions of
“how” and “why,” in contrast to the “how much” questions that
drive quantitative research (Boeije, 2010). Qualitative research
methods are especially well-suited to investigate little known phe-
nomena, that is, to map a phenomenon in all its complexities.
Additionally, on the basis of such rich mappings, questions with
regard to frequency can be developed. In general, qualitative
research generates hypotheses, which can be tested further, also
with quantitative research means. Besides, qualitative research
methods are particularly suited to investigate personal experi-
ences without distorting them by forcing them into pre-defined
categories. Given that the effects of DBS treatment for psychiatric
patients are still a relatively unknown territory, and that our aim
is to get a grip specifically on the patients’ experiences, qualitative
research lends itself well for our project.
Our research roughly follows the “grounded theory approach”
(Strauss and Corbin, 1994). That is, the data collection is pri-
mary and we develop our theory along the way of making sense
of these data. Instead of starting research with a theory and test-
ing it through the collection of data, the theory is developed by
interpreting the data, from “bottom-up.” As is the usual prac-
tice in qualitative research, data collection and data analysis are
continuously alternated. Our research is a loose variant of this
approach, because we do bring in our own specific expertise
in phenomenology and ecological psychology, which inevitably
shapes our analysis and the kinds of concepts that we use. Our
analysis is thus phenomenologically inspired in the sense that
we mainly draw on phenomenological concepts in developing
a theory out of the data. In this philosophical paper, we focus
on presenting the model that we have developed out of our
data so far.
Of the wide range of qualitative research methods, we have
used semi-structured interviews. These interviews consist of
broad, open questions in order to elicit, and stay as close as pos-
sible to, the patients’ own experiences. They are semi-structured,
which means that the interviewer has an (evolving) list of topics
to be covered. If those topics are not brought up by the patient,
the interviewer will inquire after them—again using only open
questions. The interviews start by asking patients to sketch their
personal background, and the course of their disorder. After this
introduction, the main question is asked: “what has changed as
a result of DBS treatment?” The topics are divided into three
sections. The section “person” consists of questions on changes
with regard to body and movement, perception, emotion, cogni-
tion, action, interests, and abilities. The section “social” explores
changes in social interactions and relationships. And lastly, there
is a section on existential questions pertaining the patients’ rela-
tion to themselves, and to their surroundings, their stance on their
disorder, and their experiences of freedom and time.
PATIENTS
This study is based on interviews (by the first author) with 14
patients, all of whom are treated with DBS in the nucleus accum-
bens, and receive, or have received, CBT. The sample consisted of
7 women and 7 men, ranging in age from 25 to 67 at the time
of the interview. The patients are at various stages of treatment:
some have been stable for years, while others are still in the initial
phase of finding the right DBS settings.
PRELIMINARY RESULTS
It turns out that when the DBS is effective the phenomenological
effects are both global and thorough. We now give a selection of
quotes to illustrate the wide range of phenomenological changes
that occur.
Some patients immediately experience effects after switching
on the battery:
‘I am back again: I can feel myself again. I can feel the ground.
(. . .) The colours are brighter. (. . .) Before there was just fear, now
I am back again.’ (P7)
‘It is as if you are very much in love all of a sudden. (. . .) As
if you become much lighter somehow, but in very pleasant way.’
(P1)
‘I felt very emotional and I felt I was becoming happier. Yes,
and less anxious. (. . .) And somewhat more indifferent. Like:
What do I care?’ (P2)
‘When the DBS was turned on, that was very strange! I had this
pleasant feeling all of a sudden. (. . .) Right before, I had been quite
negative and then, two minutes later, I was thriving. (. . .) Before
I saw all the restrictions, you know, from having this disorder. All
the things I cannot do. (. . .) But after the DBS was turned on, I
thought: “oh but I can do this”.’ (P3)
‘I just started talking, also to all those doctors around the table,
and I didn’t look up to them anymore, I just regarded them as
ordinary humans, you know.’ (P14)
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Patients often describe their changed experience in terms of
mood:
‘With the right settings, I am in a better mood. I can immedi-
ately notice that. It’s . . . my breathing is calmer and more relaxed.
(. . .) I feel less tense and so, well, I have less the need to do these
compulsive actions’ (P3)
‘The change in my mood, in my feeling of hope and courage,
is very noticeable in my urge to make plans. (. . .) To think beyond
where you are at the moment.’ (P1)
Long-term effects include spontaneous actions, changes in social
interactions, the ability to enjoy, and even the experience of being
oneself:
‘It is as if the shutters have been opened up. I can now take a
much lighter perspective on things.’ (P1)
‘I make plans, positive plans (. . .) [Before the DBS] I would
not have dreamed about setting up an online store, or maybe I
would have dreamed about it, but then like ‘that will never work
out anyway’. But now I think: ‘oh, I can give it try.’ (P3)
‘I found myself picking up the phone, and even saying yes to
an invitation. Just like that. After I hung up, I thought: ‘what have
I done?’ (. . .) But then I thought: ‘so what?’ (P4)
‘I found myself doing things without thinking. That is pretty
scary.’ (P10)
‘I know I actually have a spontaneous nature. (. . .) And I think
I am getting closer now to who I really am.’ (P5)
‘I can enjoy the things that I do more. Before it was only
obligations, now it is sometimes even fun, you know.’ (P3)
‘I have changed, yes. I have come more out of my shell, so to
speak. I can enjoy life more than before.’ (P6)
‘I am more laconic.’ (P1)
‘My world has become so much larger. Before, I just lived in a
cocoon of compulsions.’ (P14)
‘And than I feel that, it is incredible, I feel that my fear is
decreasing, so then I am not having a cup of coffee with a
psychiatrist, but with another human being!’ (P13)
As these quotations from the interviews illustrate, the effects of
DBS on the experiences of OCD patients are global and thor-
ough. Indeed, it seems warranted to say that the patients’ way
of being in the world has changed. So how can we understand
these experiences? Can we discern a pattern among these experi-
ences? Is there one central effect that in turn results in the other
effects? For example, is changedmood the pivotal factor? The first
effects patients generally report are effects on their mood: being
less anxious and more open. Are these first effects also the most
fundamental? Or is rather the changed sense of agency the hinge
on which all other effects turn? Patients report more spontaneous
actions, less excessive thinking, and a tendency to make plans, all
effects that are related to a normalized sense of agency. They seem
to rely more on their own actions and perceptions. Or should we
even regard a changed sense of self as the key effect?
All of these elements seem to play a role. So how do they go
together? In the next section we will propose an encompassing
model in order to try to integrate and relate these various changes.
AN ENACTIVE AFFORDANCE-BASED MODEL
From a phenomenological perspective, psychiatric disorders such
as OCD can be understood as a different way of being in the
world. Similarly, we can understand the effects of DBS on the
patients’ experiences in terms of changes in their way of being
in the world6. We propose to flesh out this, admittedly somewhat
vague, notion of being in the world in four aspects: (1) person;
(2) world; (3) characteristics of the person-world interactions; (4)
existential stance toward these (1), (2), and (3).
Such an analysis is a tricky business, as the notion of a differ-
ent way of being in the world is precisely meant to emphasize the
holistic character of disorders. That is, disorders are not regarded
as a coincidental heap of a number of independent symptoms:
there is a coherence to these symptoms. Our analysis is not meant
to deny or undermine this coherence: rather, it offers a means to
develop a better understanding of what such a different way of
being in the world amounts to. Spelling out various aspects helps
to structure and relate the patients’ diversity of experiences.
As the notion of being in the world already conveys, it is
the interrelatedness of person and world that is at stake. Now,
drawing on insights from enactivism and ecological psychology,
we can develop a renewed perspective on what such dynamic
person-world interactions amount to—one that fits with the
(neuro)biological dimension of psychiatric disorders7. Enactivism
(Varela et al., 1991; Thompson, 2007; Stewart et al., 2010) offers
a dynamical systems perspective on the fundamental relatedness
(or “coupling” in enactive terms) between person and world.
The focus on dynamics implies the relevance of taking into
account the development and (mutually) reinforcing loops of
coupled processes. And it is precisely such loops, gone awry,
that we have seen to play an important role in the development
of OCD, such as the hyper-reflexivity trap that we described.
Regarding person and world as an integrated complex sys-
tem implies a thoroughly relational perspective. This fits well
with insights from ecological psychology, notably the concept
of responsiveness to affordances (Gibson, 1979; Chemero, 2003;
Rietveld, 2012a).
Taking the person-world interactions as central also opens the
way to investigate the different ways in which this interaction
takes place. That is, apart from investigating the world and the
person pole of the interaction, respectively, we can categorize dif-
ferent characteristics of these dynamic interactions. Finally, we add
the “existential stance” to the picture, that is, the acknowledge-
ment of the fact that we can evaluatively relate to what we do
and who we are—a crucial element in psychiatric disorders and
their treatment. We will now discuss these four aspects of the
person-world interaction in turn and show how they capture the
6Some of these changes will be inherent to the process of recovery per se, such
as the shift from inward to outward directedness that we will describe later on.
Our aim is to shed light upon what happens as a result of DBS treatment, but
this does not imply that all these changes are unique for this specific form of
treatment. Like wementioned before, DBS does provide a unique opportunity
to witness in vivo processes that are otherwise likely to take much more time.
7We will not pursue this issue here. For more on how an enactive approach
can relate the various dimensions of psychiatric disorders see: (De Haan,
Submitted manuscript).
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various phenomenological changes that OCD patients experience
through DBS treatment.
WORLD: A FIELD OF AFFORDANCES
The experience of oneself and the experience of the world are two
sides of one interaction, and in any situation, the focus can be on
either. For instance, when I focus on the world, the tea beside me
can attract me; it can invite me to take a sip; but when I focus on
myself, I can feel I am thirsty. The self-description and the world-
description point at different aspects of the same phenomenon,
they just differ in focus. Another example: I can tell you that I feel
hopeful, or I can confidently describe my plans for the future.
As the phenomenological psychiatrist Van den Berg writes:
“Our world is not primarily a conglomeration of objects that can
be described scientifically. Our world is our home, a realization
of subjectivity.” (p. 39–40). Consequently, “when the psychiatric
patient tells what his world looks like, he states, without detours
and without mistakes, what he is like” (p. 46). Our experience
of the world reflects our needs, wishes, insecurities, in sum, all
that we care about—plus our own history of previous interac-
tions. Thus, how I experience the world does not only depend on
what is in fact out there, but it also depends on what I notice:
what is salient to me. And this will in turn depend on two things:
on my concerns (my current needs and interests and what I gen-
erally care about), and on my abilities (e.g., whether I perceive
the steep face of the rock as accessible or not will depend on my
climbing abilities). In short: how we perceive the world depends
on what we can do and on what we care about doing.
This idea of the fundamental intertwinement of world and
individual was first proposed by VonUexküll (VonUexküll, 1920)
in his notion of the “Gestaltkreis.” Gibson (1979) later introduced
the notion of “affordances.” Affordances refer to the possibili-
ties for action provided to us by the environment (Gibson, 1979;
Reed, 1996; Chemero, 2003). It is a truly relational notion: in the
case of human beings, affordances are relations between aspects of
the environment and available abilities of the individuals within
a form of life, (cf. Chemero, 2003; Kiverstein and Rietveld, 2012).
Which of the many available affordances a particular individual is
responsive to in the particular situation, i.e., what invites, repels,
or attracts the individual, depends both upon the individual’s
abilities and concerns (i.e., needs, interests, preferences), and on
what the environment offers (Rietveld, 2008). We are surrounded
by many affordances: a cup affords drinking from (and throw-
ing at somebody, if need be), a phone affords calling someone,
books afford reading, people afford talking to, and so on. We are
immersed in and responsive to a whole field of affordances.
We distinguish between the landscape of affordances and a field
of affordances. The landscape of affordances refers to all the possi-
bilities for action that are open to a specific form of life and depend
on the abilities available to this form of life. In our human case
this notably includes socio-cultural practices. The landscape of
affordances thus describes the so-called “ecological niche” of a
form of life. A particular aspect of the environment, say a tree,
can play a role in the landscape of affordances of multiple forms
of life. Von Uexküll (Von Uexküll, 1920) gives the famous exam-
ple of an oak tree: for a rabbit it affords digging a hole between
its roots, to a woodworm it provides food, for a person it could
afford shelter from sun or rain, or cutting. The field of affordances
refers to the relevant possibilities for action that a particular indi-
vidual is responsive to in a concrete situation, depending on the
individual’s abilities and concerns. The field of affordances is thus
a situation-specific, individual “excerpt” of the general landscape
of affordances.
We propose that the changed world that our OCD patients
describe can be fleshed out in terms of changes in their field of
relevant affordances. We can distinguish three dimensions to this
field: the “width” refers to the broadness of the scope of affor-
dances that one perceives. This dimension relates to having a
choice or action options. The “depth” of the field refers to the
temporal aspect: one not only perceives the affordances that are
immediately present here and now, but one is also pre-reflectively
aware of future plans and possibilities for action: the affordances
on the horizon that one is responsive to, so to speak. This tem-
poral horizon reflects our anticipatory affordance-responsiveness.
Lastly, the “height” of each of the affordances refers to the rel-
evance or importance of the affordances that one is responsive
to, i.e., to the experienced solicitation or affective allure. This
dimension of relevance and salience relates to motivation8.
Figure 1 gives a schematic depiction of different fields of
relevant affordances.
8This dimension of relevance or salience needs further unpacking. As one
of our reviewers remarked, there are many different ways in which the per-
ceived environment can solicit activity. Something can be important because
it is dangerous and needs to be avoided, or because it is highly attractive
and pulling us in. This means we need to further explore in future work the
relation between affective salience of the affordance, and whether something
presents itself as an attraction or rather as an “avoidance.” In our schematic
depiction we have used colours to add some differentiation to the dimension
of experienced relevance. The height refers to the intensity of the relevance,
whereas the colours are meant to reveal something about the affective salience
of the affordance. An affordance can be highly relevant because it seems life
threatening (say, red), or because it is related to the person we are in love
with (say, pink). We thank the reviewer for highlighting the need for further
research on this topic.
FIGURE 1 | Sketch of different fields of relevant affordances.
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To the extent that either our concerns or the environment
change, the field of relevant affordances changes too. It is thus
a dynamic field in all three dimensions: the scope of available
affordances at a particular place that are taken into account
by the person changes; the time span of the horizon of affor-
dances changes; and there will be shifts in our concerns and,
related to that, in the relative salience or relevance of the available
affordances.
This notion of the field of relevant affordances allows us to
make the phenomenological characterization of psychiatric dis-
orders as changed ways of being in the world more concrete. For
example, Figure 1B depicts the field of relevant affordances of a
depressed patient. In contrast to the normally extended and dif-
ferentiated field in Figure 1A, nothing stands out anymore; it is all
the same gray, unattractive world that one is surrounded by. And
this will go on and on endlessly: nothing sunny can be expected
from the future either. We can depict the field of patients suffer-
ing from OCD, on the other hand, as extremely narrowed down
to just the immediate affordance of what HAS to be done NOW
(Figure 1C). Before any other relevant affordance may announce
itself, completing the compulsion has first priority. First I need
to thoroughly wash my hands, before I can even think of doing
something else. The field of OCD is very much a field of fear
or anxiety: fear narrows down the focus to just what is feared,
and fear takes primacy over all other perceptions and actions.
Psychiatric disorders can affect all three dimensions.
EFFECTS OF DBS ON THE FIELD OF AFFORDANCES
We can now take another look at some of the patients’ experi-
ences and see how we can understand them as changes in their
respective fields of affordances.
‘I find that I can go for groceries much more easily, that I am
not afraid to enter shops anymore.’ (P4)
‘The change in my mood, in my feeling of hope and courage,
is very noticeable in my urge to make plans. (. . .) To think beyond
where you are at the moment.’ (P1)
‘A large part of my daily life is now filled with social contact,
talking to people, making plans, and just trying to get these off the
ground.’ (P4)
The structure of the field of relevant affordances changes in all
three respects as a result of DBS treatment: (a) the patients’ inter-
est in possibilities for action broadens, which is reflected in the
increased width of the field of affordances that are taken into
account by the patient; (b) the patients orient themselves on a
larger time scale, which is reflected in increased depth; and (c)
their detection of relevance becomes more adequate, that is, more
in line with the totality of their concerns, which means that dif-
ferentiation of affordances in terms of relevance increases. The
first two aspects can be summarized as a growing ability to look
beyond the here and now. Using the terminology of Heidegger
(Heidegger, 1927/1978), we can say that they have recaptured the
“Entwurf ” side of their existence: the ability to relate not just to
the actual, but also to the possible. Patients refer to having hope
again, to making plans for the future, to being more broadly
interested. When patients speak of feeling “open,” of “seeing pos-
sibilities” again, of realizing that they “can do” things, and of
“seeing perspective,” this conveys the double movement that they
open up to the world and the world opens up to them.
With regard to the third aspect, the relevance of the avail-
able affordances, patients report both more indifference andmore
involvement. It turns out that they can be more indifferent to
objects and situations that used to draw all their attention (such as
dirty dishes, potential sources of bacteria, etc.), and take an inter-
est again in the things that they care about (e.g., in going out with
friends and family). In short, we can say that their field of affor-
dances now reflects their concerns beyond themere urge to reduce
the strong tension and anxiety. That is, their field of affordances
now reflects what really matters to them once the distortion of
anxiety is lifted. When we picture the red cubicle as a schematic
structure of the field of affordances of OCD patients, we can
picture how that red cubicle shrinks, and a more diverse and bal-
anced field of affordances emerges from behind it, so to speak.
Importantly, patients do not consider their interests to be new:
they had always wanted to go horse-riding, or to study psychol-
ogy, or to play in a band—it is just that before this was impossible
due to their disorder and had slowly become unimaginable.
SELF-EXPERIENCE
This second aspect puts the focus on the person in the person-
world interaction: it refers to the person’s, typically pre-reflective,
experience of herself in the interaction. To take our example of
thirst: when focusing on the world-aspect, i.e., the field of affor-
dances, the cup of tea shows up as highly salient and attractive to
us. The self-experience side of this interaction is feeling thirsty.
The field of affordances reflects this experience: it is the other side
of the coin, so to speak. This aspect encompasses moods, feelings,9
and self-experience in general.
EFFECTS OF DBS ON THE PATIENTS’ SELF-EXPERIENCE
‘I dare to speak up for myself more. (. . .) That is a whole new
dimension. People are surprised sometimes: “she has become a
fierce lady”.’ (P2)
‘I am less anxious, and that also expresses itself bodily. (. . .) I
don’t get into a panic that often anymore; I am better able to find
solutions’ (P5)
‘With the right settings, I am in a better mood. I can immedi-
ately notice that. It’s... my breathing is calmer and more relaxed.
(. . .) I feel less tense and so, well, I have less the need to do these
compulsive actions’ (P3)
‘After the DBS I have become calmer, I don’t panic so easily
anymore’ (P5)
‘I dare to take risks now. I have become much more daring,
more impulsive also.’ (P2)
‘I don’t dwell upon things as long as I used to’ (P5)
9Several psychologists have argued for distinguishing a world- and a self-
aspect to emotions (Lambie and Marcel, 2002; Frijda, 2007): there is a way
in which the world appears when you are in a specific emotional state and
there is a way in which you feel when you are in that state. In our terminology,
one can focus on the world-aspect of an emotion by looking at the changes it
brings about in the field of affordances (e.g. what action possibilities show up,
what we regard as salient, etc.). Or one can focus on the person-aspect, that is,
the person’s self-experience.
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One of the most common reports of our patients is that when
DBS is effective, they experience a lessening of their feelings of
tension and anxiety. Many patients also report an increase in self-
esteem and feeling equal instead of inferior to other people. They
speak out more, express themselves more, are more assertive.
Many patients report changes in their social interactions: they feel
more like interacting with others.
These experiences could well be related: the balance between
anxiety and trust seems to shift toward the latter. Patients recount
that they feel more confident, and they dare to do things again.
This is reflected by the fact that they see more possibilities for
action: the broadness of their field of affordances widens.Whereas
being anxious entails withdrawing oneself, patients now speak
of being more open to the world, including being open to other
people.
CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSON-WORLD INTERACTIONS
So far, we have fleshed out the two sides of the person-world
interactions. We introduced the notion of a field of affordances
to depict the world as experienced by the person. The other
side of this interaction is the person’s experience of herself while
responding to this field. Apart from these two sides to the interac-
tion, we can distinguish a third element, namely the way in which
persons relate to the world. This aspect refers to the characteristics
or modes of relating, the “how” of the interaction.
This dimension of our model aims to capture the changes that
patients experience with regard to the way in which they relate
to the world. Their experiences point to changes in at least four
different characteristics. First of all, one’s intentionality can be
primarily outward or inward directed. Is one’s focus on what one
is doing, or more inward directed, occupied by one’s feelings and
thoughts? Secondly, the interaction of the person with her world
can be more or less flexible. This refers to the extent in which
one is responsive to other possible actions. Can one easily switch
between different affordances? A third characteristic already came
to the fore in our discussion of the phenomenology of OCD,
namely the amount of reflexive attention that one pays to one’s
action. Is the action performed unthinkingly, or rather with delib-
erate attention? Lastly, there is an affective dimension to the way
in which one relates. For instance, are things done in a stressed or
rather in a relaxed way?
These characteristics of the interaction are of course intimately
connected with both self-experience and the field of affordances.
In general, one’s self-experience will likely (come to) reflect the
way in which one interacts, and vice versa. For example, if one is
much quicker to respond and has a less deliberating way of deal-
ing with the world, one will probably experience oneself as more
spontaneous. The same goes for the structure of the field of affor-
dances: that will (in time) reflect one’s way of relating as well. For
instance, when one is rigidly focused on one task, one may lose
sight of all the other tasks that one should also take care of. In this
case the broadness and the horizon of the field of affordances will
shrink.
The extent to which one pays deliberate attention to what one
does may, in the long run, also have consequences for the field
of affordances. We already introduced the hyper-reflexivity-trap
to refer to the unsettling effect of paying too much conscious
attention to what one does. In reaction to this unsettling effect,
OCD patients may restrict their life world to just those actions
that they can control. Inversely, a continual imbalance in the other
direction, namely too little deliberation and reflexive awareness,
will also affect the structure of the field of affordances. If one
would never step back to reflect and only relate unthinkingly to
the present situation, one would not be able to pursue more dis-
tal goals and direct one’s efforts accordingly. The horizon of the
field of affordances would then shorten to the immediate here
and now.
EFFECTS OF DBS ON THE CHARACTERISTICS OF PERSON-WORLD
INTERACTIONS
‘I dare to take more risks’ (P5)
‘I dare to do things again’ (P2)
‘I am somewhat calmer now: I can keep my attention focused
on my work instead of the compulsions’ (P3)
‘I used to have more control. Now my actions go faster than
my thoughts. (. . .) My actions now just go automatically, instead
of how I used to do it.’ (P10)
‘What I did not used to dare, the things that I did not even dare
to begin with, I started doing them. I still found it scary, I was just
as afraid of it, but I did it anyway.’ (P2)
‘I am better able to put things into perspective. Not so black
and white anymore, but more looking at things from both sides,
so more grey, you know. (. . .) I am not so quick to judge anymore
(. . .) but I stay careful who I can trust and who not’ (P5)
‘The intensity, the anxiety, and the amount of compulsions
have diminished. (. . .) as if it is crumbling away in all aspects’ (P4)
We can see that patients are (a) more outward directed, (b) more
flexible, (c) acting more unreflectively, and (d) in a less stressed
way. Thus, as a result of DBS-treatment, not only has their field
of affordances changed, and their self-experience, but also their
manner of attaining grip on this field.
With regard to the first characteristic, patients report a shift
from more inward to more outward directedness, and related to
that, an increased openness to available affordances. The world
of obsessions and compulsions is unavoidably a very self-focused
world. As long as the experienced tension is so strong, all other
things have to wait. The less consumed the patients are by their
obsessions and compulsions, the more space opens up for other
interests and for attention to other people. Here too, there are
looping effects operative: the increase in openness results in more
interactions with the world, and this can in turn have a positive,
“pulling” effect on the patients. Patients for instance engage in a
sport club, and the expectance of the other members motivates
them to show up even if things are going less well. Friends are
more inclined to call, when they find that the person now indeed
answers their calls.
The second characteristic is increased flexibility, which shows
itself in various ways. Patients for instance report that they
are more easily distracted from their obsessions and compul-
sions. But the flexibility also refers to “cognitive” flexibility,
such as the flexibility to change one’s opinion, or to be less
inclined to think only in black and white (P5). The increase
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in creativity that some patients report, too, can be under-
stood as a more flexible, associative way of relating to the
world; an increased playfulness or openness to unconventional
affordances.
With regard to the third characteristic, there is a shift from
deliberate steering to more spontaneous, unreflective engage-
ment. The balance between reflexive awareness, and deliberation
on the one hand and unreflective immersion in action on the
other, has normalized. As we noted earlier, this is an important
characteristic of the phenomenology of OCD. The spontaneous
actions also include the spontaneous diminishing of compulsive
behaviors. That is, patients may simply forget to perform some
of their rituals—and sometimes they do not even notice it until
someone else points it out to them.
And lastly, patients experience less tension and stress: even
when they still perform some compulsions the intensity of the
tension has reduced.
EXISTENTIAL STANCE: EVALUATION OF SELF-WORLD
INTERACTIONS
EXISTENTIAL STANCE
So far, we have distinguished three aspects of the person-world
interactions. First, we fleshed out the world-aspect in terms of a
field of relevant affordances. Secondly, we looked at the person-
aspect, e.g., the side of self-experience, including moods and
feelings. Thirdly, we have distinguished various characteristics of
the person-world interactions. Now, we want to introduce the
fourth and last element: the existential stance. The existential
stance refers to the person’s evaluative relation to her world and
to herself.
We do not just experience things, but we can also be aware of
having these experiences, and we can relate to our experiences.
We can take a stance on events in the world, and on other peo-
ple. And we can take a stance on ourselves: on what we do and
think and feel. We can be ashamed of present or past wrongs,
we can be proud of ourselves, we can lie and feel guilty about
lying, and we can dread things in the future or look forward to
them. Just as the world does not appear neutral to us, but is
full of things that attract or repel us, our interactions are not
neutral to us either. That is, our stance-taking is an evaluative
stance-taking.
Due to our capacity to reflect, we unavoidably relate to our-
selves and the world around us. We can even relate to things that
are not present: we relate to our past and future, and we can
relate to imagined scenarios and events. The German philosopher
Plessner (Plessner, 1981) calls this our ex-centric position: we do
not coincide with our present situation but we can take a stance
on it and thus obtain some degree of freedom and possibilities for
change.
From a structural perspective, the existential stance can be
seen as an extra “loop” in the system: not only does a per-
son interact with her (social) environment, she also relates to
these interactions and to the part she plays in them. The exis-
tential stance refers to this second-order relation. Thus, whereas
the field of affordances refers to the first-order perception or
experience of the world and self-experience refers to the first-
order experience of oneself, the existential stance refers to the
person’s second-order relation to these primary aspects of the
person-world interaction10.
Even though this second-order relation presupposes the abil-
ity to reflect, to detach oneself from the here and now, this does
not imply that such a stance can only have the form of an explicit
judgment or deliberate reflection. In fact, our stance on things
is usually rather implicit in the way we behave. For example, the
fact that I value friendship is manifest in my deeds. When I call a
friend that I have not spoken to in a while, I am simply comply-
ing withmy interest in contact withmy friends. I am not explicitly
putting my values into practice: it is rather that my field of affor-
dances reflects what I care about. It may even be the case that I am
not aware of how important my friends actually are to me, until
someone comes along and points out that I spend a considerable
amount of my time talking to friends, and thinking about them,
and so on.
An important part of this existential relation is the stance we
take toward ourselves. This includes implicit and explicit evalu-
ations of who we are and who we want to be, what we consider
to be our virtues and our vices. For people suffering from psychi-
atric disorders, this relatedness to oneself also includes a stance on
their illness. Is the disorder considered an alien element that has
just struck one out of the blue? Or is it on the contrary difficult to
draw a line between what is part of who one is (e.g., perfectionist,
or boisterous) and what might be part of a disorder (e.g., OCD,
or ADHD)?
The existential dimension is highly relevant in psychiatry, both
with respect to the etiology as well as the treatment of psychi-
atric disorders. The way in which patients relate to themselves
and their situation may be an inherent part of the disorder itself.
For instance, in the case of anxiety disorders, patients may suf-
fer most from the fear of the possibility to get another panic
attack. To make things even more complicated, psychiatric dis-
orders can also affect patients’ stance-taking. For example, part
of being depressed consists of having no hope for future change
and of a distorted perception of the past. Second order feelings of
both shame and guilt often also constitute negative spirals. They
stand in the way of social contact, while isolation generally wors-
ens the situation. Both shame and guilt considerably contribute to
the patients’ suffering and feelings of loneliness as well. Moreover,
feelings of shame may prevent patients from seeking help, whilst
their condition worsens.
With regard to the other aspects we have distinguished, it is
worth noting that the existential stance can bear upon any of
these. With regard to the third aspect, one can take a stance on
the way in which one interacts with the world, for instance one
can enjoy and endorse one’s more spontaneous way of responding
to the world. And where the second aspect refers to the first-order
self-experience, the existential stance refers to the evaluation of
10It is important to note that this existential relation does not come over
and above our ‘basic’ interactions with the world: it rather changes the whole
person-world system—our way of being in the world. For instance, even our
most basic biological acts such as eating, drinking, defecating, sleeping, and
having sex are thoroughly shaped by our specific socio-cultural practices and
mean much more to us than only the satisfaction of a biological urge (De
Haan, Submitted manuscript).
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that self-experience: one can for example blame oneself for being
down again. The first aspect, the field of affordances, reflects the
world as experienced. The existential stance refers to the fact
that one can also think about and assess one’s situation from a
more observer’s perspective. In OCD this difference between the
first-order experience of the world and the second-order reflec-
tive stance on the world is striking. For, as we already noted,
OCD patients may experience all kinds of events as threaten-
ing even though they are well aware of the irrational nature of
their fears and compulsive actions. From such an observer’s per-
spective patients may know that there are other possible actions
available to them (they are aware of the richer landscape of affor-
dances), but their experience of tension narrows down their field
of relevant affordances to just the compulsion that needs to be
done first.
EFFECTS OF DBS ON THE EXISTENTIAL STANCE
‘I did not quite notice the changes at first, other people pointed
me to what was happening. And only then I started to think and
realized what had changed’ (P5)
‘I am much closer now to who I really am.’ (P5)
‘I found myself doing things without thinking. That is pretty
scary.’ (P10)
‘I lashed out to the children. I reacted a bit too severe. That
does not fit me.’ (P10)
‘My wife pointed out to me that the casing that I built around
the pond looked a bit sloppy. I had a look, and she was right! I
would never ever deliver sloppy work. It always had to be perfect.
And now, I saw it was sloppy, and you know what? I did not even
care!’ (P14)
‘I am more laconic.’ (P1)
‘The increase in libido was a side-effect. That is really not who
I am.’ (P1)
‘Now I think: things will work out somehow. But before,
nothing would ‘just work out’.’ (P4)
‘I can have much more normal contact with others now. My
daughter or son-in-law call and invite me to a birthday party, or
ask if they can come by at my place. Yes, and then without think-
ing about it, I just say yes. Because: I want to come, but then
I realize: what am I saying? I really have to get used to myself,
you know. Those excuses always, never being able to make any
appointments. . . and then I just say ‘yes, sounds good’. And I
think: Is that me? It is a bit strange, I have to get used to myself
too.’ (P4)
The existential stance refers to the patients’ evaluative relation
to their changed way of being in the world. In the case of
our patients, one of the central issues concerns their evaluation
whether or not a certain change suits them. Changes may be
endorsed, i.e., considered as contributing to becoming more one-
self, or they may rather be regarded as mere side-effects. For
example, the increase in libido is a common change, and some
patients welcome this as a restoring of their “natural” libido that
got lost as a result of the disease, whereas other patients clearly
distance themselves from it and regard it as a side-effect. Similarly,
for some patients, the experience of doing things unthinkingly is
a bit scary, others, however, are happy about their spontaneous
reactions and feel they have become more themselves.
Assessment of what does and does not suit one’s “identity” is
of course complicated. As several patients remarked: who knows
who you would have been if you had not developed OCD in your
youth or childhood? One patient (P14) said that he now finds
himself doing things in a similar way as his father used to do
them. That strengthens his intuition that these changes indeed
allow him to be more himself.
Not only the patients themselves wrestle with these questions:
so do their loved ones, and their therapists. Partners may have a
different assessment of the changes than the patients themselves
have. For instance, a patient may feel much better and more him-
self, whereas his partner considers him to be have become overly
assertive and ruthless. The difficulty is that partners often only
know their partner with OCD. Besides, within the relationship
partners have somehow found a way to deal with the disor-
der, and have established certain shared patterns of interaction.
The fast and profound changes the patient goes through can be
unsettling for the partner as well: their world changes too. And
when patients and their partners differ in their assessment of the
changes, this poses a difficulty for the therapist, as she needs to
decide to what extent the patient and the partner are able to give
an accurate evaluation.
Another issue concerns the patients’ stance on having an
implanted device. Here too, patients differ in their assessment.
Most patients have no problem with it, or even regard it as a
part of their body, “in the same way that a new hip becomes
part of one’s body as well,” as one patient formulated it. Others
feel uncomfortable about it, either because they are concerned
about their dependency on the continuing care of the hospital or
because they feel somewhat ashamed. A patient recounted that
she is very careful about informing people about the DBS after
she found out that some of her neighbors refer to her as “the
cyborg”11.
The existential stance plays a double role in the effects of
DBS treatment on the phenomenology of OCD patients. On the
one hand, patients evaluate the changes they experience due to
DBS treatment, with all the ensuing influences. But, interestingly,
the patients’ evaluative stance may itself change through DBS.
Patients especially take a more laid back stance on themselves and
their world. They report that they have become less perfectionist
and that they actually endorse this change (like the patient who
made a casing for the pond). Or patients not only care less about
what others might think of them, but also embrace this more
laconic attitude.
SUMMARY: FOUR ASPECTS, ONE WAY OF BEING IN THE WORLD
The four aspects presented in our model (the field of affor-
dances, self-experience, the characteristics of the person-world
interactions, and the existential stance) increase our insight in
the phenomenon of a changed way of being in the world. It pro-
vides a structure to analyze the complex, global changes that OCD
patients experience during DBS treatment. As we have stressed,
these aspects really go together in the global way of being in the
world. Take for instance this quote:
11For more on the stance people may take on “artificial” elements in their
bodies, see: (Slatman, Forthcoming).
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‘You have lived your life aside of the world, all those years,
decades. I have had days that I was so turned inwards, continu-
ously doing my rituals. And then I was lying in bed and heard at
the radio that it had been a rainy day. And I thought to myself,
was it rainy today? I had no idea. And your gaze has passed the
windows of your house a thousand times, but you don’t notice it,
there is no outside world anymore. (. . .) But then I caught myself
really listening to the news and I realized this might be a sign of a
small, beginning, change. You start to read the newspaper, and you
start to talk to people, say what they think of the financial crisis or
something. Yes, it becomes more and more your own world.’ (P4)
This quote shows how the aspects cohere, how it all fits within
a unitary way of being in the world. The patient’s way of being
in the world has changed: the narrow field of affordances of a
life filled with compulsions gives way to an opening up to the
world (aspect 1). Instead of his inward directedness and con-
stant deliberation on how to avoid getting “contaminated,” he
now reacts spontaneously (aspect 3). We can say he regains his
unreflective responsiveness to relevant possibilities for action,
such as picking up the ringing phone, or listening to the news
or to what other people say. These affordances regain their rel-
evance and solicit action again (aspect 1). His noticing of the
changes and interpreting them as positive signs is an instance of
the evaluative or existential stance (aspect 4). P4 describes how
he increasingly participates in our shared world, and how ful-
filling this is for him in contrast to the loneliness of his small,
solitary, compulsion driven world (aspect 2). Later on he says: “I
still have problems, but these are ordinary problems, that every-
body has, such as a lack of money. I am so happy to have ordinary
problems now.”
BRAIN AND PERSON
We saw that treatment with DBS can induce profound changes in
the patients’ way of being in the world. What does this imply with
regard to the relation between brain and personhood? If electrical
stimulation of a specific brain area can bring about such pro-
found phenomenological changes, does that mean that we “are
our brains” as some neuroscientists (Crick, 1995) like to state?
Let us start by noting that the treatment of our patients is not
limited to manipulating the brain only. DBS treatment encom-
passes more than just turning on the device. It usually takes
months to find the optimal settings of the electrodes, and during
this time the patient comes to the department weekly or bi-weekly
and is intensively monitored. Moreover, patients also take part in
CBT. It appears to be the combination of DBS and CBT which
makes the treatment all the more effective. DBS diminishes the
patients’ experience of anxiety and tension and many improve-
ments follow naturally from that. Double-blind experiments in
which DBS is turned either on or off indeed show that DBS
is effective (Denys et al., 2010). But CBT (or other psychother-
apies) often play a crucial role in recovery as well. For years,
or even decades, the patients’ lives have revolved around their
compulsions. And even if the felt urge to perform compulsions
diminishes through DBS, it still takes effort and practice to shape
a new way of living. The therapists help them not only to reduce
the time spend on their compulsions, but also to discover and
develop alternative skills and activities that they now finally have
time to engage in. Many patients report that the success of treat-
ment consists in precisely the combination of DBS and CBT: the
DBS provides the crucial thrust that enables to them to success-
fully engage in CBT. “It is hard work,” says a patient, referring to
CBT, “but I am so glad that I am now finally able to do it.”
Still, we have shown that DBS can bring about profound
immediate phenomenological changes. Does the effectiveness of
DBS commit us to a neuro-reductionist account that goes against
the idea behind neurophenomenology (Varela and Thompson,
2003; Thompson, 2007)? It does not. Our findings support an
enactive, systemic perspective rather than a reductionist one.
The first thing we need to clarify is the relation between neu-
ral processes and experience. If one starts from the assumption
of two ontologically different processes that subsequently need
to be related, one is likely to end up with either a dualist or
a reductionist view. From an enactive perspective, however, we
rather start from the whole complex system of a person interact-
ing with the landscape of affordances. The experiential dimension
and the neural dimension are different excerpts from this complex
system—at different levels of resolution (De Haan, Submitted
manuscript). Experience depends on the whole system of a person
interacting with her world in a concrete situation. The brain too
functions only within this entire system. When we look at neural
processes, we are in fact zooming in on what happens in the brain
during these person-world interactions12.
A change in my experience implies or encompasses a change
in my neural processes. Interfering in the brain IS interfering in
the larger system. Because the brain is part of the person-world
system, changing the brain implies changing the person-world
system. Now, a complex system of a person interacting with her
world offers many possible ways of interfering. For instance, DBS
targets specific neural networks, CBT targets specific cognitive
and behavioral habits, psycho-analysis targets specific insights at
the existential dimension. Even though such interventions can
never be completely isolated from the context (like for instance
the treatment-relationship), all of these interventions do have a
specific target, and can be recognized as a major causal force. But
more often then not, there will be a whole mesh of direct and
indirect influences. Also it will often take a while before changes
at a local level build up to changes at a more global level of the
system. Such threshold phenomena go both ways: it may also take
time for global changes to get engrained at a local level. The com-
plexity and reciprocity of these processes fit much better with an
enactive, systemic approach than with a reductionist one.
From an enactive perspective of the complex person-world sys-
tem the effectiveness of DBS is not surprising. Given that the brain
is such an important part of the system, as a crucial connecting
organ (Fuchs, 2011a), it makes perfect sense that interventions
at the neural level have the potential to have far-reaching effects.
These effects pertain to the system as a whole—and may include
the person’s experiences. The effects of DBS thus in no way
warrant a reductionist equation of persons and their brains.
Our research project rather fits in with a non-reductionist and
12Such an enactive, systemic perspective has important implications for how
we conceive of the causality between neural and experiential processes, see:
(De Haan, Submitted manuscript).
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non-dualist approach to neurophenomenology. The particular
role of the brain is put in a broader perspective which includes
not just the person, but also her interaction with the environment.
The notion of responsiveness to a field of affordances can help to
flesh out the crucial role of our interactions with the world for
our phenomenology.
CONCLUSION
We started our paper with the observation that the global and
thorough changes that OCD patients experience during DBS
treatment are insufficiently captured by the available psychiatric
scales. These scales typically focus on symptoms only and do not
capture any other changes, such as changes in self-experience,
social interactions, existential stance, the feeling of openness
toward the world, and the way in which patients react to what
the world has on offer. Such changes are, however, fundamen-
tal to understand the impact of DBS, as well as to assess the
patients’ well-being—which in turn is an important factor in the
determination of changes in DBS-parameter settings and treat-
ment more generally. We noted that the patients’ whole way
of being in the world seems to have changed. Our aim was to
capture the changes in the patients’ phenomenology and make
sense of the broad range of changes they report. For that we
have introduced a model that fleshes out the dynamic interac-
tions between person and world in four aspects. We proposed
to specify the patients’ world in terms of a field of affordances,
with the three dimensions of broadness of scope (“width” of
the field), temporal horizon (“depth”), and salience or relevance
of the perceived affordances (“height”). The second aspect is
the person-side of the interaction, that is, the patients’ self-
experience, notably their moods and feelings. Thirdly, we have
pointed to the different characteristics of the way in which
patients relate to the world. And lastly, the existential stance refers
to the stance that patients take toward the changes they expe-
rience: the second-order evaluative relation to their interactions
and themselves.
In this paper we have limited ourselves to exploring the phe-
nomenological changes of a very particular group of patients. As
we have mentioned before, an important characteristic of DBS
treatment is that, compared to other forms of treatment, the
effects of DBS can be very quick and direct. For the aim of devel-
oping our model this provides a unique opportunity, because
it allows us to witness “in vivo” the rapid phenomenological
changes from disorder to recovery. Given that phenomenological
changes occur through other forms of treatment as well and with
patients suffering from different psychiatric disorders, we hope
that our model may turn out to be of broader use. Future qual-
itative and quantitative research will have to verify and possibly
extend our way of specifying the notion of being in the world.
Such an explicit phenomenological model may help to assign
to the patients’ experiences the fundamental role in psychiatric
practice that they deserve.
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